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WORKERS' RIGHTS:
A WINDING ROAD IN THE TRUCKING DISPUTE
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
COMMENT
Michael S. Plotkin*
L Introduction
As globalization continues to link diverse countries and cultures together,
workers' rights receive visible focus today. The violent protests of citizens at the
global trade summits in Seattle, Quebec City, and Genoa' combined with the horrific
terrorist acts on September 11 th, 2001, in New York City highlight the need for the
United States to show other nations how to abide by international trade
agreements. 2 However, numerous social, political, technological, and economic
factors influence even hemispheric trade agreements between neighboring
countries 3
The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) represents a framework for
reducing restrictions of goods and services while increasing trade and prosperity
throughout the entire American continent. One current issue that exemplifies the
delicate and multifaceted relationship between workers' rights and trade is the
dispute over opening the United States-Mexican border to commercial truckers. The
United States blocked the time frame for opening the American market to Mexican
trucks as established by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Many commentators have argued that public safety issues and politics have
overshadowed the issues of workers' rights in this controversy.4 These issues are
* Candidate for J.D., 2003, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law;
Emory University, B.A., 1996.
1 Anthony DePalma, Talks (and Protests) to Begin on Trade Pact for Americas, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2001, at W1; see also Sherry M. Stephenson, The Current State of the
FTAA Negotiations at the Turn of the Millenium, 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 317, 328
(Summer 2000) (stating that disturbances by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) during the WTO meeting in Seattle on December 1999 highlighted the need
for civil society to have a more formal role in trade talks today).
2 Pamela C. Schmidt, NAFTA: Motor Carrier Provision on the Future of the Agreement, 20
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 505, 524 (Winter 1997) (arguing that because of the
global economy, the U.S. should follow through with a good faith effort to adhere to
NAFTA rules).
3 See generally THoMAs L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXIS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING
GLOBALIZATION (1999) (concluding that understanding the technological revolution's
economic impact is the key to demystifying the globalization phenomenon and
subsequent political conundrums in countries from Thailand to Chile to the U.S. and
Former Soviet Union).
4 See Peter J. Cazamias, The U.S.-Mexican Trucking DLpute: A Product of Politicized Trade
Agreement, 33 TEX. INT'L L. J. 349 (Spring 1998) (arguing that Mexican leaders benefit
from leveraging the U.S. anti-openness stance for trucking regulations and the U.S.
government appears to be more concerned with safety issues and protecting the
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further compounded by gridlock and stranded travelers at U.S. border crossings in
part because Mexico has been identified by U.S. Intelligence as a potential avenue
for suspected terrorist activity.' However, the extra precautions at the borders
against terrorist activity are proof that money and manpower are available to ensure
safety regulations, which is a key concern for the entire trucking industry.
This comment analyzes the arguments by politicians and organized labor
advocates favoring the delay of the NAFTA motor carrier agreements in the context
of workers' rights. Despite the political rhetoric, viable solutions to the border
dispute are available. For example, while the airline business has suffered since
September 11, 2001, international airline partnerships have been very popular in
North America and Europe.6 Although commercial trucking companies primarily
carry cargo, these alliances operate with minimal emphasis on borders and promote
common standards of safety and workers' rights. Finally, greater cooperation
among federal government agencies, private insurance companies, and state
government agencies would foster better adherence to safety regulations. Effective
cooperation between the United States and Mexico is still tenable to resolve the
disagreement over trucking regulations.
IL Background & Origins of Workers' Rights during NAFTA
A. NAALC: The Labor Side Agreement
During the implementation of NAFTA, the negotiators incorporated workers' rights
and environmental protection into two "side" agreements7 - the North American
Agreement of Labor Cooperation (NAALC) and the North American Agreement of
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). The addition of a labor agreement to the
Teamsters union's interests); see also Philip Shenon, Teamsters May Stall Bush Goals
for Mexican Trucks and Trade, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2001, available at
http://nytimes.com/2000l/07/30/politics/3Otruc.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2001)
(noting that even Teamsters' critics complement the public relations strategy of
turning the issue into one of safety).
5Associated Press, US. Reshapes Face Of Open Borders, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Sept.
24, 2001, at A10 (citing reported waits up to 15 hours immediately after September
11, 2001; also included the U.S.-Canada border).
6 See Charles N.W. Schlangen, Comment: Differing Views Of Competition: Antitrust
Review Of International Airline Alliances, 2000 U. Qii. LEGAL F. 413 (2000) (explaining
the benefits of airline partnerships as an introduction to a review of antitrust
analysis in the United States).
7 Robert F. Housman, NAFTA at Age One: a Blueprint for Hemispheric Integration? 10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 301, 301-12 (Spring 1995) (providing background information on the
labor and environmental issues with NAFTA from 1990 to 1995, which was the first
time these issues had been incorporated in a free trade agreement); see also Charles
Tiefer, "Alongside" the Fast Track: Environmental and Labor Issues in FTAA, 7 MIN N. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 329 (Summer 1998) (discussing current political issues with the side
agreements in the U.S. Congress, notably the polarizing "fast track" dispute, which
would provide the president authority to bring NAFTA or other international
agreements to a vote in Congress while limiting that vote without amendments).
' Sheryl M. Dickey, The Free Trade Area of the Americas and Human Rights Concerns, 8
HUM. RTS. BR. 26, 27 (Spring 2001).
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broader-free trade framework was significant for workers rights' advocates for
several reasons. The NAALC: 1) creates a private right of action for workers, their
representatives, and other affected individuals; 2) incorporates a transparent
dispute resolution process with public access; and 3) recognizes core workers'
rights.9 The NAALC was intended to allow each participating country to enforceits own existing laws relating to workers' rights. By granting such autonomy, the
stipulation provided that each country must enforce its own labor laws.10
Moreover, the Agreement operates as a general framework for protecting workers'
rights.
In addition to representing a positive development for labor advocates, the
side agreements are significant because they encourage countries to work together
to maintain and improve labor standards. By analyzing the language of the core
principles of the NAALC, the pervasive theme of the accord is to: "promote
principles," "encourage cooperation," and "pursue cooperative labor-related
activities."" As we will see in section III of this comment, cooperation between
nations and labor advocates became politically driven. Criticism may best be
directed at the nature of the political process, rather than the NAALC's workers'
rights provisions. NAFTA's deference to each nation's sovereignty will provide an
escape for nations who fail to comply with workers' rights standards. Hence, when
trucking regulations are disputed by Mexico and the United States, organized labor
groups may convincingly argue the need to protect their own special interests or
use political agendas as pretext in their own countries. Without a basic framework
for workers' rights, the alternative could be a forceful imposition of the standards of
one country on another, which would directly contravene NAFTA's goal of self-
determination. 2
The NAALC addition provides substantial rights for the workers. In the
NAALC, NAFTA recognizes all five of the "internationally accepted" labor rights:
(1) the right of association; (2) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (3)
prohibitions on the use of forced or compulsory labor; (4) a minimum age for
employment; and (5) acceptable conditions of work, including minimum wages and
hours as well as occupational safety and health. 3 An illustrative example of a
benefit derived from the NAALC's language is that truck drivers may form their own
union by the right of association; however, the explicit rights established by the
NAALC are interpreted by the laws of each country. Therefore, a truck driver union
seeking a pay raise in Mexico would be interpreted by Mexican law, while a similar
truck driver union in the United States would need to follow American laws.
American labor unions are not allowed to organize in Mexico. The NAALC
9 Id.
10 Housman, supra note 8, at 308.
" North American Agrement on Labor Cooperation, Overview of Operations, at
http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/reviewpart3.htm (last visited Feb. 9,
2002)
12 Id. (noting criticism of the NAALC for its reliance on domestic law rather than
international standards because it allows governments to lower their domestic
standards by statutory change; alternatively, NAALC does nothing to force
governments to raise their standards to a common level).
13 19 USCS § 2467 (2001).
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sanctions and procedures that address grievances are limited to alleged violations
of a country's own specific standards, namely occupational safety and health, child
labor, or minimum wage standards. 4 Despite the broad language of NAALC's
guiding principles, the enforcement of NAFTA and the FTAA is a crucial and often
dynamic factor in the struggle to protect workers' rights.
Critics claim that the labor agreement remains largely ineffective because
the dispute resolution process provides neither adequate nor timely remedies. 5
Without an effective procedure for addressing grievances, there is no incentive for
all trading partners to cooperate without an effective deterrent against future
violations. Creating a framework for hemispheric standards and cooperation is
advantageous in many ways, but the remedy process addressing workers' rights is
by no means immediate. The two agreements that provide a long-term blueprint for
hemispheric growth, NAFTA and the FTAA, are discussed from an economic angle
below.
B. NAFTA, the FIJAA, and Economics: the General Effect on
Workers' Rights
Currently, the FTAA negotiators are looking at NAFTA as a model for the
FTAA to help extend free trade ideals to other nations throughout the Americas. 6
While NAFTA and the FTAA both support free trade, the FTAA tenet that each
nation must operate within the boundaries of its own legislation and procedures to
implement the agreements relating to free trade and human rights. 7
A general criticism of NAFTA is that while it may be an effective model for
promoting certain corporate interests, the Agreement has failed as a means to
strengthen and enforce workers' rights in North America.'8 For example, one
argument is that free trade encourages multinational companies to move their
operations to nations with weaker labor protections." The exploitation of cheap
labor at the hands of larger multinational corporations (MNCs) is one of ihe chief
concems.2 Corporations seeking lower labor costs, larger markets, new capital, and
14 Jack I. Garvey, A New Evolution For Fast-Tracking Trade Agreements: Managing
Environmental and Labor Standards Through Extraterritorial Regulation, 5 UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOR. AFF. 1, 16 (2000). See generally Bobbi-Lee Meloro, Balancing the Goals of Free
Trade With Workers' Rights in a Hemispheric Economy, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv.
433, 454 (Winter 1999).
15 Tiefer, supra note 8, at 330.
16 Dickey, supra note 9, at 27.
17 Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, 34 I.L.M. 808, 821
(1995).
IS See Dickey, supra note 9, at 27 (arguing that Mexican maquiladora plants, used
primarily for export processing, are synonymous with sweatshops and merely
exploit low standards of less industrialized nations).
19 Id.
20 Barry LaSala, NAFTA and Worker Rights: An Analysis of the Labor Side Accord After
Five Years Of Operation and Suggested Improvements, 16 LABOR LAw 319, 326
(Winter/Spring 2001).
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new technology have been moving their operations more often than in the past.21
Furthermore, free trade facilitates the movement of corporations from high-wage
countries to low-wage countries.22 Proponents of free trade agreements counterthat more jobs are being created in countries that need an economic boost.23 In
response to the global shift of corporate operations, governments of developing
nations are consequently pressured into lowering or maintaining weak labor
standards in hopes of attracting and keeping foreign investment.24 Unfortunately,
the competition for cheap labor often provides governments and corporations with
an incentive to either dissolve unions or otherwise prevent workers from advocating
for wage increases and improved conditions 25 Continuing economic disparities and
free trade policies have polarized the debate between free trade and workers' rights
groups. 26 Perhaps the quality of new jobs and productivity is more important thanthe number ofjobs created or lost.
C. The Political Backdrop
The issue of open-trucking borders in the context of workers' rights is
significant for two primary reasons. First, many countries are involved and
recognize the potential gains on a hemispheric scale.27 At the first Summit of the
Americas in December 1994, thirty-four heads of state pledged to make trade and the
environment mutually supportive and to "further secure the observance and
promotion of workers' rights as defined by appropriate international conventions."28
Second, the issues of global trade and the liberalization of the motor carrier
provisions embody the debate surrounding the politicization of workers' rights.29
Linkage30 is a key part of the trade agenda and most likely inclusive for all future
trade agreements involving the United States, since politicians throughout the
21 Linda A. Mabry, Multinational Corporations And U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking
The Concept Of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEo L.J. 563, 565 (Feb. 1999) (arguing that an
increasing awareness of conflict between globalization and nationalism and
technology policy have changed the concept of the corporation).
22 See Dickey, supra note 9, at 26 (arguing that NGOs should be given more open
access to free trade negotiations which would allow a better integration between
workers rights protections and free trade agreements).
23 id.
24id.
25id.
26 Richard W. Fisher, Address at the Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business
Fall Symposium, The Changing Labor Markets of the Western Hemisphere: Labor Issues
Relating to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Oct. 5, 2001).27id.
2 8 Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan ofAction, 34 I.L.M. 808, 821
(1995).
29 See Cazamias, supra note 4 (arguing that Mexican leaders benefit from leveraging
the U.S. anti-open border stance for trucking regulations, and the U.S. government
appears to be more concerned with safety issues and protecting organized labor
interests); see also, Shenon, supra note 4.
30 See Garvey, supra note 15, at 10 (explaining that linkage is the premise that labor
and environmental concerns should be included in free trade agreements).
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world are concerned about the impact of trade liberalization on labor.3 As early as
the 1990's, former President Clinton realized that some form of concession to
organized labor would be necessary to counter the response by environmental and
labor supporters worldwide.32
Officials from Mexico and the United States have been working together
for years to solve trade disputes3 3 In 1994, both nations agreed to standardize
safety operations regarding hazardous materials and to set up an electronic
communication system to exchange information about commercial drivers.34 While
pre-NAFTA rules limited Mexican trucks to a twenty-mile radius across the border,
by December 18, 1995, the United States was supposed to allow Mexican trucks
access to the four border states: Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California.3
However, citing safety reasons and the lack of mutually acceptable standards, the
Clinton administration delayed the first phase of the NAFTA-mandated trucking
provisions.36 Accordingly, negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico continued to
establish acceptable safety standards. Three years after the Phase I date, if Mexican
drivers followed American insurance and safety regulations properly, access to the
entire United States would be granted.37 However, this was not the case.38 Instead,
in 1996, the United States froze the Mexican truck permit license process.3 9
In 1998, Mexican and American officials engaged in a new series of
discussions to resolve the safety issues.4 Mexico publicly stated that it intended
to undertake the final dispute settlement panel mandated under Chapter 20 of
NAFTA because they never received clear safety demands from the United States.41
In addition, the Democrats' standing reputation as supporters of organized labor
and the Teamsters' campaign backing of Presidential hopeful Al Gore in 2000
31 Id.
32 Id.; see also David E. Sanger, Dilemma for Clinton on NAFTA Truck Rule, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec 17, 1995, at A36 (noting that the Clinton administration announced its decision
to delay implementation of the motor carrier provisions before a hearing could be
held in the Teamsters suit; evidence uncovered in a Senate report on campaign
fundraising shows high level meetings between Administration and Teamsters
officials on the trucking issue; and many argue that the Administration received
significant man-hours in campaign work and financial contributions as a result of
the NAFTA trucking decision).33 See generally Cazamias, supra note 4, at 352.
3 id.
35 See Michael Skahan, The Nafta Trucking Dispute With Mexico: Problem? What
Problem?, 5 NAFTA: L. & Bus. Rrv. AM. 603, 606 (Fall 1999) (arguing that both sides
benefit from political leverage of the problem and concluding that no solution is
likely in the near future).
36 Id.
37 id.
3 See generally Shenon, supra note 4.39 Cazamias, supra note 4, at 357.
40 US., Mexico to Make New Stab at Solving NAFTA Trucking Dispute, AM. TRADE, Feb. 5,
1998, at 1-2.
41 Skahan, supra note 37, at 619.
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contributed to the delay of trade liberalization and NAFTA guidelines.4 2 Whileeconomic labor theories are one part of trade negotiations, politics play just as large
43a role, if not larger. In the U.S. House of Representatives, a vote passed requiringMexican trucks to meet U.S. safety standards before the government would open
borders. 4 In the U.S. Senate, 19 republicans crossed party lines to end a filibusterdesigned to prevent a bill amendment to increase restrictions on Mexican trucks
entering the United States.345
Statistics play a large role in fueling the political debates as well. For
example, opponents of NAFTA, such as the AFL-CIO, estimate that between
300,000 and 400,000 American jobs have gone to Mexico since 1994.46 In contrast,
the U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce claims that 1.7 million export-related jobs
have been created in the United States since 1993 .4' The political struggle between
workers' rights and organized labor continues today in the congressional debates
over trucking regulations.
D. Basic Differences in the Legal System of Mexico and the United
States
A basic comparison of the approaches to labor and employment law
explores how workers' rights may be developed and protected differently. While
both Mexico and the United States have a system of federal laws to establish rules
and procedures,348 the judicial interpretation for enforcement of those laws is
remarkably varied. First, neither the Mexican federal courts nor the Mexican
Supreme Court are nearly as powerful as their U.S. counterparts. 4 9 Second, instead
of relying on case precedent (stare decisis) as U.S. courts do, a Mexican high court
42 Shenon, supra note 4 (providing political history behind Clinton and Gore's
reasoning for blocking Mexican truck access to the U.S.); see also Skahan, supra note
37, at 606 (discussing former U.S. Transportation Secretary Federico Pena's sudden
policy switch over opening border restrictions with Mexico in 1996).
3 Jonathan B. Wight, Address at the Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business
Fall Symposium, The Changing Labor Markets of the Western Hemisphere: Labor Issues
Relating to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Oct. 5, 2001).
44 Labor Research Association, Teamsters Deliver a Blow to Bush's Trade Agenda on
Mexican Trucks, at http://www.laborresearch.org/dis.shtml?naftatrucks.txt (last
visited Sept. 30, 2001).
41 Id. (noting that the vote was 70-30 vote on July 26, 2001).
46 See Adolfo Garza, Five Years Into NAFTA, Pact's Merits Still Debated, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 3, 1999, at 23A.
41 Alfredo Corchado & Laurence iliff, NAFTA Stirs Up internal Troubles, Some Industries
Flourishing Others Ailing Under Trade Pact, Series: Five Years of NAFTA: Mexico s Mixed
Results, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Jan. 3, 1999, at 1A.
41 Labor Relations Law in North America, available at http://www.naalc.org/
english/pdf/mexico.pdf (noting that in Mexico, the key federal legal sources are the
Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, the Federal Labor Law, and
international treaties approved by the federal Senate and signed into law by the
President).
49 Jorge A Vargas, MEXICAN LAW: A TREATISE FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND
INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS 51 (1998).
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decision is only binding if five decisions in a row are decided similarly." Third, a
very unique feature of Mexican law mandates that individuals have the right to sue
an authority of Mexican government for violations of individual rights, but the
result is limited to the particular plaintiff only and provides no general protection. 1
Finally, in 1995, then President Zedillo enacted sweeping restructuring of the
Mexican courts to try to improve effectiveness. 2 Thus, while the laws of both the
United States and Mexico safeguard basic constitutional rights of freedoms such as
assembly and petition, the relative power of judicial review compared to the
executive branch represents a stark contrast.5 3
Similarities do exist between the United States and Mexico in the
codification of laws. Both the Mexican Constitution and the Federal Labor Act of
1970e' provide for workers' rights, while in the United States, the First Amendment
of the Constitution protects the rights of assembly, speech, and petition.5 In
Mexico, Article 9 of the Constitution protects the general right of association,56 and
Article 123 establishes a long list of workers rights, such as the right to form trade
unions and the salary rules prohibiting age or sex discrimination. 7 However,
Mexico has adequate labor standards in place, but its weak judicial branch lacks
appropriate mechanisms to enforce the labor laws for all workers, and the NAALC
has been very slow to facilitate such enforcement.5
DIL Standards compared: Mexican vs. U.S. workers: A look behind the
posturing
The most relevant arguments against opening the Mexican border include:
1) Mexican trucks are unsafe and 2) infrastructure problems exist at the border.5 9
50 1d. at 58 (explaining Jurisprudencia in that Mexico is a civil law country and rejects
the principle of precedent; Jurisprudencia represents an exception to the rule in
Mexico and highlights the diminished role of Mexican courts to provide effective
and timely redress of wrongs).
51 Id. at 60-61 (noting that this element of Mexican law is called Amparo and
corporations or larger institutions inundate the court system with these "individual"
suits to create gridlock).52 Id. at 52.
53 See Wight, supra note 45 (arguing that the economics underlying the judicial
system are also fundamentally different. 5% of the landowners own 75% of the land;
while it is unknown how much it takes to bribe a judge in the U.S.; the difficulty is
much less in Mexico).
5' Vargas, supra note 51, at 58 (noting that the FLA governs collective labor
relations- all unions are subject to the politically controlled Confederation of
Mexican Laborers (CTM)).
55 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56 CONST. Art. IX (1917).
" CONST. Art. 123 (1917).
58 Lasala, supra note 22, at 320.
59 See Skahan, supra note 37, at 611-19 (noting that drug trade will be treated in this
comment as an enforcement issue); see also Cazamias, supra note 4, at 352-55.
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A. Current Process and Regulations
Trucking industry analysts would agree that the process of cross-border
trucking today is cumbersome. For example, one shipment from Mexico to the
United States requires three drivers and three different vehicles to haul a single
freight shipment. A typical interline "partnership" consists of a Mexican carrier, aU.S. carrier, and a "middleman." The middleman's job is to transport goods between
temporary warehouse sites on opposite sides of the border.61 This three-step
process will be simplified when the border becomes fully open to Mexican trucks.
Realizing these inefficiencies and other procedural concerns, both
American and Mexican officials have met for informal consultations since 1996 to
develop the idea of a "joint review board" to assess license requests for trucks from
Mexico.62 Despite these government efforts, safety standards differ and include
commercial drivers' license issuance, hours of service requirements, and regulations
on truck sizes and weights. 3 Concerning commercial drivers' license regulations,
Mexico's minimum age requirement is eighteen, while the U.S. minimum is twenty-
one.64 Additionally, no foreign language requirement exists, and some truckers whoare unable to converse with the general public or read highway signs may increase
the risk of danger.65 Regarding maximum driving hours behind the wheel, Mexican
law has no limit, while the U.S. limit is ten hours and must be recorded in the drivers'
logbook.66 For truck weights, Mexican law allows a maximum gross weight of
170,000 pounds, while the U.S. limit is far less at 80,000 pounds.6 7 Mexico has also
joined the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance to ensure consistent roadside
inspection procedures between the United States and Canadian localities and has
cooperated by providing training sessions for Mexican drivers. 6  While these
differences appear significant, freezing the application process will not necessarily
protect U.S. citizens from all of the potential safety dangers.
B. Mexican Labor Arguments
Mexican labor opposition to the border dispute is complex. One argument
is that Mexican trucking companies, fearing that open competition with larger
American trucking companies will cause their businesses to suffer, lobbied for
60 Duane W. Acklie, Address to The House Highways and Transit Subcommittee of
the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (July 18, 2001) available at
http://www.truckline.com/insideata/comments/ 071801_statementackliel.html (last
visited Oct. 7, 2001) (stating the ATA position for NAFTA favors high safety
standards through U.S. insurance carriers while ensuring equitable restrictions in
line with current U.S. and Canadian standards).
61 Id.
62 Cazamias, supra note 4, at 354-55.
63 Id. at 357.
64 Id. at 353.
65 id.
6Id. at 357.67id.66Helene Cooper, Shif Into Reverse: Ban on Mexican Trucks in US. Interior Shows Rise of
Protectionism, WALL ST. J., Feb 5, 1996, at A10.
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delaying the implementation of the new rules. 9 Canacar, the largest Mexican
trucking industry trade group,70 has lobbied the Mexican government to void the
NAFTA trucking provision.7 Despite the assumption that Mexican companies
would welcome access to the larger market, the many routes in the United States,
and possible creation of more jobs, the Mexican reaction to U.S. opposition appears
politically motivated72 Mexico is concerned that other U.S. businesses use the
opening of borders as leverage to gain access to Mexican markets.73 For example,
the Mexican government restricts U.S. small package deliveries and U.S. bus service
companies.74 Thus, protectionism clouds free trade issues for Mexican as well as
U.S. companies. Based on assumptions, politics, and general uncertainty about
economic impact, Mexican trucking companies will be reluctant to opening borders
without guarantees of financial security.75 Meanwhile, both the U.S. and Mexican
governments may not be doing enough to alleviate those fears.
C. United States' Labor Arguments
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Teamsters) has lobbied
against the border opening since NAFTA's passage and has also filed suit in federal
court to block the border opening.76 The Teamsters have 1.4 million members, but
reportedly union numbers are decreasing.77 Traditionally, one of the main concerns
for U.S. labor unions is the proverbial "race to the bottom. 78  On one hand,
opponents of free trade say that with less industrialized trading partners, industry
and jobs migrate to the countries with lower standards, and lower costs.79 The
result is that standards worldwide are pushed downward which leads to the disparity
among the standards of workers' rights.0 However, compelling economic factors
indicate that this fear could be more aptly called the "race to the top."8 '
The argument for protecting workers' rights may overlap with an argument
about representation of those rights. For instance, as part of the U.S. talks with
Mexican President Vicente Fox, Teamster President Jimmy Hoffa was scheduled to
69 See Chris Kraul, NAFTA May Deliver Blow to Mexican Truckers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15,
2001, at A 1; see also Sanger, supra note 34, at 617.70 Id. (citing sources that Canacar represents 78% of Mexican commercial rigs).
71 id.
72 See Cazamias, supra note 4, at 3 53 (noting that Mexico would have violated its own
law if it had not made a decision on the U.S. trucking application).
73 Skahan, supra note 37, at 618 & nn.144-145.
74 Id. n.147.
75 See Kraul, supra note 71.
76 Cooper, supra note 70.77 See Shenon, supra note 4.
78 Garvey, supra note 15, at 7.79 Id.
'o Id. at 7-8.
8' See generally Fisher, supra note 28 (citing statistics showing trade, goods, and
services have increased to 26% of GDP in U.S.).
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discuss the right of U.S. labor unions to compete in Mexico.82 Currently, Mexican
law prohibits foreign labor organizations from operating in the country, so Mexican
workers could possibly gain greater protection if U.S. labor organizations were
allowed to operate in Mexico, as U.S. unions are allowed in Canada. This discovery
is crucial because it points to politics as overreaching and at times overshadowing
the general protection of workers' rights.
In response to safety concerns voiced by the Teamsters, the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) said that the national treatment requirements of
NAFTA mandate that the United States not impose substantially different
standards on Mexican drivers than American drivers. 3 Thus, an equal protection
guarantee is provided under NAFTA. Furthermore, Mexican carriers would be
required to meet U.S. insurance requirements and reciprocal access provisions.
U.S. insurance coverage should be a key component to allowing foreign commercial
vehicle entry into the United States and ensuring vehicle safety. The American
Trucking Association (ATA) supports NAFTA and the opening of borders to
Mexican trucks. 5  Similarly, the ATA believes that safety standards may be
maintained at the same level for American, Mexican, and Canadian trucks.86 The
ATA also advocates timely insurance inspections to ensure minimum safety
requirements.87 The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration could oversee the
insurance regulations, just as it currently improves trucking companies' awareness
of security for hazardous material carriers.88
In 1999, a U.S. safety study indicated that the failure rate of American
trucks was twenty-five percent (25%), while the failure rate for Mexican trucks was
forty-four percent (44%).89 However, this study was criticized because the types of
trucks were limited to Mexican drayage equipment, not long-distance haulers, which
are typically older and in worse condition. ° These drayage rigs are used to
transport freight between import lots on both sides of the border for short
distances.91 In fact, the United States has no data about the safety of Mexican long-
82 See Francis X. Donnelly, Mexico's Fox, Union Chiefs To Talk, DETROLT NEWS, July 13,
2001, available at http://detnews.com/200I/autos/0107/15/aO1-247026.htm (last visited
Oct. 2, 2001).
83 Skahan, supra note 37, at 611 (citing 10 I.C.C. 2d 854 (Nov. 30, 1995)); see also
Acklie, supra note 62.
84 Skahan, supra note 37, at 611.85 Acklie, supra note 62.
86 Id. (noting an argument that Canadian truck drivers currently lack substance
abuse testing requirements, but Mexican truck drivers would be required to do so).
7 Id.
88 FMSCA Commences Educational Visits to Hazardous Material Carriers, at
http://www.truckline.com/
insideata/truckon/09260 1fincsahazardousmaterials.html (Sept. 26, 2001).
89 Scott Bowles, Audit: Mexican Trucks Pose Safety Hazard, USA TODAY, Jan 11, 1999,
at 3A.
90 Caziamas, supra note 4, at 360 (explaining that drayage is an industry term relating
to the type of truck).
91 Id.
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distance freight trucks.92 Finally, this misleading statistic hides the reality that many
Mexican trucking companies have fleets in condition as safe as those of American
truck companies.
Another important argument relating to delays at border crossings is
information technology.93 For example, inspection requirements, traffic management
problems, and cargo clearance procedures contribute to the amount of time it takes
for a truck to clear the border.9' Increased staffing could possibly alleviate some of
the delays, but in the current budgetary environment, allocating costs will be
difficult95  While expensive, automated customs clearing centers could streamline
the border crossing process.96 This automated system, known as the North
American Trade Automation Protocol (NATAP), standardizes all import-export
information needed for trade and then uses electronic methods to convey pertinent
information on the truck, driver, and cargo to the border inspector.97 NATAP has
been implemented successfully at certain border cities.98 However, Teamsters and
most Democrats prefer the current defaco border delays despite knowing that they
violate the NAFTA time frame and that technology exists to improve cargo
inspections.
IV. Enforcement & Effects
A. Business'The largest infrastructure obstacle to physically crossing the border is the
long wait that truckers face.99 Some industry analysts estimate the extra expenses
associated with squeezing the vast amount of trade through border choke points at
$2.5 billion per year.'0 Proponents of increased infrastructure spending claim that
there are not enough bridges, rails, or docks to handle the goods and that existing
facilities are often poorly located.'0 '
Logistically, the border restrictions are cumbersome for other industries as
well. Because of the ban, trailers from each truck must be unhitched near the border
and reconnected to an American truck.-' 2 Manufacturers, such as automobile part-
92 id.
93 Skahan, supra note 37, at 608.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96Id.
97 Bill May, Trade Highway System Tesvts Face Delays, THE J. REC., Feb. 11, 1997,
available at 1997 WL 14385275.
98 See Bonnie Pfister, Short-Circuiting Short-Haulers: Electronic Cargo Monitoring System,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Aug. 1, 1997, at 3H, available at 1997 WL13202654
(noting that border cities include: Otay Mesa, California; Nogales, Arizona; El Paso,
Texas; Detroit, Michigan; Buffalo, New York; and Laredo, Texas).
99 Skahan, supra note 37, at 607.
1'o See Anna W. Mathews, NAFTA Reality Check: Trucks, Trains, Ships Face Costly
Delays, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1998, at Al (quoting James Giermanski, Texas A&M
International University).
101 Skahan, supra note 37, at 608.
102 Donnelly, supra note 84; see also Labor Research Association, Union Organizing
Gains in 2000 Were Outpaced by Layoffs and Retirements, at http://www.laborresearch.
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makers like Delphi Automotive Systems Corp., are reportedly losing business
because of the delays at the border. 3 The volume of trade, coupled with complex
inspection requirements, traffic management problems, and cargo clearance
procedures contribute to the amount of time required for a truck to clear the
border.04
B. Drug Trade
The drug trade argument is important to understand the issues in light of
Mexican and American politics. Immediately after September 11, 2001, narcotics
smuggling decreased considerably due to stricter security measures at border
crossings.'0 5 While it is unclear how much longer the deterrence will limit drug
trade, evidence suggests that border security enhancements have a beneficial
effect. If U.S. agencies are able to maintain security levels sufficiently, safety issues
may be adequately addressed for the long term.
V. Despite Potholes in the Road, Better Harmony between NAFTA, Bush, and
Labor in 2002?
A. Political Compromise
Contrary to the political approach of the Clinton administration, President
George W. Bush publicly expressed America's willingness to obey the NAFTA
rules for implementing the border schedule."' 6 His first step was to address the
concern among critics that the United States was succumbing to international
pressure, namely the NAFTA arbitration panel's decision on February 4, 2001 that
the United States had violated its side of the Agreement.0 7 However, Bush agreed
to honor the arbitration ruling while adamantly requiring that Mexican trucks must
meet the same safety and operating standards for U.S. and Canadian trucksl
Thus, future safety plans would level the playing field for Mexican and U.S.
trucks.' 9 President Bush has also warned Congress that he would veto any bill
delaying a timely opening of the borders."0 Furthermore, the U.S. Department of
org/unionstats/ 2000_memb.html (Jan. 25, 2001) (noting that following a gain in
1999, the number of members fell by 219,000 in 2000, according to data tracked by
the U.S. Labor Department).
103 Donnelly, supra note 84.
104 Skahan, supra note 37, at 608.
105 See, e.g., Chris Kraul, After Attacks, Traffic of All Kinds Slows at U.S.-Mexico Border,
L.A.TIMES, Oct. 3, 2001, at A19.
106 See generally LaSala, supra note 22.
1"7 Robert Collier, U.S. Proposes Delaying Checks of Mexican Trucks: They'd Duck Border
Scrutiny up to 1 /2 Years, S.F. CHlRON., May 2, 2001, available at http://www.
sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2001/05/02/
mn46804.dtl (last visited Nov. 21, 2001).
"'sNorman Y. Mineta, Address at the University of Texas, Edinburg Pan-American
U.S.-Mexico Border Summit (Aug. 22, 2001) available at http://www.dotgov/affairs/
082201sp.htm (presenting a federal government plan on behalf of President Bush to
address safety concerns in the trucking dispute).
109 Id.110 Id. (noting that the schedule calls for open borders by January 1, 2002).
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Transportation will mandate close coordination between both state and national
government officials and truck and bus company officials."
B. International Airline Alliances
One additional solution would be to follow the basic guidelines
implemented by the airline industry's international alliances. Despite the absence of
strict regulatory control by the Federal Aviation Association and an open skies
agreement, 112 an alliance system could emerge similar to "SkyTeam (Delta Airlines,
AeroMexico, Allitalia, and Qantas), "OneWorld" (American Airlines, British
Airways, Aer Lingus, LanChile, Cathay Pacific), and "Star" (United Airlines and
Lufthansa). Airlines have chosen to enter into codeshare agreements for the
following reasons: customer satisfaction improves through a more seamless travel
experience and an expanded choice of destinations, baggage travels directly to the
destination, frequent-flier miles accumulate, and reservations/ticketing systems
combine to yield back-end technology savings. 13 Other benefits to the airline
companies include new or additional access to more markets, increased business,
and cost benefits.14 Granted, these benefits may not be realized by all airlines due
to myriad business factors."'
As long as antitrust laws are followed, a bilateral business partnership of
Mexican and American trucking companies could then concentrate on maintaining
safety standards, maximizing resources, and eventually increasing productivity.
Interestingly, a Mexican-American partnership exists within the ATA; however, the
need for a middleman makes the operation horribly inefficient."6 In addition, by
allowing trucking unions the ability to contract or form partnerships with Mexican
trucking companies, this competition would encourage Mexican trucking companies
to maximize efficiency. Finally, allowing American insurance companies to establish
financial incentives for Mexican truck companies to comply with safety standards
could alleviate public safety fears.
1' Id.
112 See Schlangen, supra note 7, at 425.
113 Id. at 416-417.
114 Statement of United States International Air Transportation Policy, 60 FR 21841,
21842 (May 3, 1995).
... Cary, Susan, Crash Of Flight 587 Further Strains Airlines, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2001
at A3 (explaining that U.S. airlines are posting unprecedented financial losses
following the disastrous terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and that after the
accidental crash of American Airlines flight 587 on November 12, U.S. carriers are
expected to lose at least $7 billion this year according to the Air Transport
Association); see also http://www.washington post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A 6 3 108-
2001Oct3.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2001) (noting that Sabena SA, the national
airline of Belgium, announced it will seek bankruptcy protection on October 3, 2001;
SwissAir grounded its fleet after it lacked the money necessary to operate following
September II attacks; airline alliances were not intended to provide financial
security against tragedies like terrorist attacks).
116 See Acklie, supra note 62 (arguing that the cross-border middleman is the one that
uses older trucks and one shipment requires three drivers and three trucks).
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